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more in conunon with their contemporary counterparts than scholars -often non-historically minded 
sociologists - have assumed. After a brief analysis of comments by and about teachers in pre-
industrial England, Cressy cites from a 1980 journal article on the professionalism of contemporary 
teachers and concludes: '' Teachers today display an insecurity of status, an anxiety about professional 
position, akin to that of their predecessors in early modern England" (149). 
The articles by D.R. Hainsworth on estate stewards and by Ian Roy on army officers are less 
informed by theoretical considerations or by the questions raised by Prest in his Introduction than 
are the others in this volume. They do, however, oblige us to pay attention to two occupational groups 
that were undoubtedly important and are frequently neglected. 
In general, the editor of this volume and the authors of the essays have performed a valuable 
service to scholars of early modern England by providing us with information of professional groups 
at least some of which have been fairly obscure and for placing the scholarship on these groups in 
a broader theoretical and historiographical context. 
* * * 
Michael G. Finlayson 
University ofToronto 
James Pritchard- Louis XV's Navy, 1748-1762. A Study of Organization and Administration. 
Montreal and Kingston: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1987. Pp. xiv, 285. 
The navy of Bourbon France has long been a neglected and little understood institution. The 
historiography of naval warfare in the age of sail, in fact, has been dominated by studies written from 
a British perspective, and French fleets, sailors and maritime organizations have generally only 
appeared as the unfortunate and usually inferior victims of the Royal Navy's fighting expertise. 
Recent work by such scholars as P.W. Bamford and E.H. Jenkins has begun to even the 
balance, and this new contribution by James Pritchard will provide invaluable organizational and 
administrative underpinning for the ongoing process of reassessment. Pritchard is concerned neither 
with the sea campaigns themselves nor with the erratic strategic ideas which guided the navy in peace 
and war; rather he sets out to analyze how the French navy functioned as an institution and how its 
administrative structure affected its operational performance. Intensive archival research and a sound 
grasp of general scholarship on the Bourbon monarchy have enabled him to perform his task 
admirably, with the result that historians need no longer scratch their heads in puzzlement at the dismal 
battle performance of the naval arm of an outwardly impressive military state. 
French naval policy in the mid-eighteenth century was hamstrung by a confused, almost 
baroque institutional frameworl<. Political heads carne and went with disruptive frequency, the various 
operational and administrative branches of the service overlapped in function and competed for control 
of poorly defined responsibilities, and the ramshackle procurement system not only failed to extract 
the necessary logistical and manpower requirements from the available pool of resources, but did 
serious damage to sources of supply in the process. An antiquated financial system doomed the navy 
to crises of liquidity and credit, denying it access to badly needed funds under the strain of war. Finally, 
French naval institutions themselves interacted with the crumbling administrative organs of Bourbon 
absolutism in such a manner as to render the pursuit of coherent policy functionally impossible. 
Pritchard develops his case through a careful sequential analysis of each of the major com-
ponents of the French naval organization: the secretaries of state, the central bureaux, the Officers 
of the Pen and the Sword, sea and land-based manpower, naval arsenals and the vessels they built 
and maintained, ordnance and stores procurement, and the financial structure within which the entire 
operation was forced to function. If there is a problem with this manner of treatment it is simply that 
it postpones consideration of financial practices until the end of the book, despite the fact that the 
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inability to mobilize and control funds , or even to budget rationally, lay at the centre of each of the 
individual problems tackled in the bulk of the text. Full comprehension of the author's case is thus 
denied the frustrated reader until he has digested a whole series of incomplete judgements, judgements 
conditioned by material denied him by an organizational structure better suited to a detective thriller 
than an historical monograph. 
Overall, Pritchard's case is convincing, but his work is as much an example of the weaknesses 
of the institutional approach to history as it is a splendid example of the genre at its most sophisticated. 
Throughout the text individual failures are set against the dark background of a crumbling Bourbon 
state and an overwhelmingly strong enemy presence off the coast. Yet the author makes no systematic 
attempt to work either factor into his analysis. He proves conclusively that institutional shortcomings, 
particularly those of a financial nature, lay at the heart of the navy's poor performance in the crisis 
years of 1758-59, but his limited brief prevents him from understanding the relationship between 
these shortcomings and important external factors. Occasional references to the stultifying effects 
of general governmental failure and British naval might only serve to convince the reader that full 
understanding of the collapse of French maritime policy is only possible outside the confines of 
institutional analysis. If the administrative structure of the Bourbon navy impeded reform, the relative 
strenghts of the state behind it and that state's major adversary ultimately rendered long-term progress 
impossible. 
* * * 
Malcolm Cooper 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
G. D. Ramsay -The Queen's Merchnnts and the Revolt of the Netherlands: The End of the Antwerp 
Mart, Vol . II. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986. Pp. 231. 
This straightforward, closely focused , and solidly researched narrative by G.D. Ramsay is , 
as he says in his preface, the second volume of an " enquiry into the end of the Antweip mart in English 
history ." "English" should receive the emphasis because, despite the implications of the title, this 
book is really not an analysis of the Dutch Revolt, or an analysis of the multiple causes of the decline 
of the Antweip mart in European history. Throughout the book, the author interweaves two processes: 
the economic and political. The longstanding trade in unfinished woolen cloths from England to the 
Low Countries, chiefly in the hands of the Company of Merchants Adventurers (the 'Queen's Mer-
chants' of Ramsay's title) , was crucially important to the English economy, increasingly so in the 
sixteenth century as the volume of this trade increased shaiply. It was no less essential for the English 
monarchs who drew a healthy proportion of their budget from customs revenues generated by the 
trade. Thus, any interruption of Anglo-Netherlands trade had serious economic and political ram-
ifications. Since such trade was twice interrupted in the 1560s, it is here that Ramsay focuses. 
The 'Ancient Amity' inherited from the fifteenth century between the house of Burgundy 
(which by the 1560s meant Spain) and the English crown was a political alliance with economic 
shorings, institutionalized in an agreement called 'The Intercourse.' First formulated in 1496 and 
reaffirmed several times in the sixteenth century, the Intercourse gave the English Merchants Ad-
venturers a privileged position at Antwerp, of no small moment as Antwerp became the dominant 
entrepot of northern Europe . So, if the lords of Antwerp, Philip, Elizabeth and her Merchants had 
so much to gain by continuing the 'Amity' and the Intercourse, why, Ramsay ponders, did things 
fall apart in the 1560s? Despite his concern to show the interconnections between economics and 
politics, his explanation is distinctly political in its coloring, and not simply, he asserts, because of 
the nature of the evidence that he employs (his argument leans heavily on dispatches of ambassadors 
and other political papers) . He admits that "there were limits to political action set by social and 
